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Enterprise Red TeamingControlled Lab Demonstration

Multi-Stage Attack Path Validation in Hybrid Active Directory Architecture

SECTOR: Enterprise IT & Identity Architecture|intelligence. security. innovation.
Controlled Laboratory Environment DisclosureThis technical case study was executed within isolated research testbeds (Parasym Security Research Range / AI Defense Lab / Industrial Security Lab). It simulates authentic enterprise architectures without representing a specific commercial client engagement.
Target Scope & Environment
Isolated Enterprise Research Range (1,200 Endpoints)
Classification / Standard
CWE-285: Improper Authorization / Identity Graph Chaining
Client / Testbed
Parasym Security Research Lab Testbed

01.Context & Authorized Scope

Executed in the Parasym Security Research Range, an isolated enterprise lab simulating an on-premises Active Directory forest (1,200 simulated endpoints) synchronized to Entra ID (Azure AD). The lab was configured with typical legacy technical debt, including multi-tiered administrative permissions and third-party software service accounts.

02.Security Question Tested

Can an attacker operating from an assumed-breach position on a standard corporate workstation chain non-vulnerability identity misconfigurations to achieve Domain Admin privilege without triggering typical signature-based endpoint alerts?

03.Testing Approach & Methodology

Beginning from a low-privileged domain user account on a workstation, operators conducted non-invasive identity graph reconnaissance using BloodHound to map shortest permission paths to Tier 0 assets without active port scanning to evaluate defensive thresholds.

04.Observed Technical Evidence

Graph queries revealed: 1. An unrotated service account (svc-backup-exec) with registered Service Principal Names (SPN). 2. An auxiliary server configured with unconstrained Kerberos delegation. 3. Misconfigured GenericWrite ACL permissions granted to the IT-Helpdesk security group over the OU housing management jump hosts. Offline Kerberoasting of the service ticket yielded the plaintext credential of svc-backup-exec. Authenticating as this account allowed leveraging the delegation-enabled server to capture simulated high-tier Kerberos TGT tickets.

Chained Escalation Path Sequence
[Standard Workstation User] 
       │
       ▼ (Kerberoast SPN: svc-backup-exec)
[Service Account Credential Extracted]
       │
       ▼ (Abuse GenericWrite ACL over IT-Helpdesk OU)
[Administrative Jump Host Access]
       │
       ▼ (Unconstrained Kerberos Delegation Ticket Harvesting)
[Domain Administrator (Tier 0) State Achieved]

05.Demonstrated Impact & Operational Assumptions

In the simulated lab range, demonstrated how three independently low-severity configurations combine into a full domain compromise path. (Operational Assumption: Assumes initial compromise of a standard domain-joined workstation and weak password entropy on legacy service accounts).

06.Engineering Remediation

Following path verification, defensive hardening guidelines were implemented: 1. Implemented administrative tiering (Tier 0/1/2 isolation based on the Microsoft Enterprise Access Model). 2. Disabled unconstrained delegation across domain members, replacing it with Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD). 3. Migrated legacy service accounts to Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA) featuring automated 128-character password rotation. 4. Enabled Kerberos AES encryption enforcement and configured SIEM alerts for anomalous TGS requests (Event ID 4769).

07.Verified Retest Outcome

Chained escalation paths were severed in the lab environment. The demonstration validated that graph-based relational path modeling provides defense visibility that isolated vulnerability scans cannot offer.

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